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INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs / Appellants ("Neighbors") and Appellee / Mclntyre are
neighbors in that they own adjacent parcels of land whose boundaries adjoin on a
terrace about 75 feet above, and overlooking, Little Cottonwood Creek. The
Creek flows through Mclntyre's property, dividing it so that about one acre is on
the other side from his house. That acre runs from the Creek's bank up to the top
of a terrace, where the boundaries adjoin with the Neighbors' boundaries.
Mclntyre's house and most of his property lie in the Creek's first level flood plain,
while none of the Neighbors' property is in the flood plain.
Mclntyre wanted a bridge to connect the two sides of his property, which
required a permit from the State Engineer to disturb the creek during construction
to build the bridge's abutments.l That "Permit" is limited, allowing for
disturbance of the stream for the purpose of constructing the bridge abutments that
must lie outside the Creek's channel. Once granted, the Permit would allow
Mclntyre one year to construct the bridge abutments and restore the natural
stream's bed and banks, even though those abutments do not enter or encroach
upon the stream or its banks or environs after construction. The work must be
completed before expiration, and any further or new alteration (such as stream

l

A permit from the Corps of Engineers is also required, but Neighbors chose not address
that permit at any stage of this case.
1

disturbance to remove the abutments) would require a subsequent permit.
Neighbors protested Mclntyre's application to the State Engineer, but the
Permit was granted. Neighbors then requested reconsideration, which was
granted. After further comment, however, the Permit was again granted..
Mclntyre began construction of the bridge after receiving the Permit in October
2006 because it would expire on Oct. 11, 2007. Appendix A. Mclntyre wanted
the bridge completed before high water.
On December 15, 2006, Neighbors filed a complaint in District Court
before Judge Iwasaki, seeking two things and two things only:
•

A reversal of the State Engineer's approval of Mclntyre's application
granted on October 11, 2006, which would expire on October 11, 2007; and,

•

A preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin and restrain Mclntyre
from constructing a bridge. They chose not to seek an emergency TRO at
that time.
Mclntyre moved to dismiss, arguing that, unlike the application process

where interested parties were allowed to comment, statute required that to have
standing to appeal the State Engineer's decision, Neighbors must be "persons
aggrieved" by the decision and that Neighbors had not made the necessary
allegations to be either aggrieved or afforded injunctive relief.
While the suit was pending, Mclntyre also faced a practical dilemma - he
2

could suspend construction during litigation, in which case the Permit would
expire, or he could continue with construction and risk losing if the abutments had
to be removed. Mclntyre chose the latter and construction openly and obviously
proceeded without Neighbors seeking to enjoin it. 2
Oral argument for Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for April
16, 2007. Then, on March 23, 2007, Neighbors sought an emergency temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to halt the construction of the bridge.
(R. 159 - 211.) This was five months after the Permit was issued, and after the
bridge deck had been fabricated and the abutments' concretefootings had been
poured. An "on record" hearing was held in chambers on that day and the motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and a preliminary injunction restraining further
construction was denied. Neighbors did not appeal from that ruling and the bridge
was soon in place.
On April 16, 2007, the trial court heard Mclntyre's motion to dismiss for
lack of standing. Relying to some extent on the proffers from the March 23 rd,
2007 hearing, Judge Iwasaki ruled Neighbors lacked standing and dismissed the
case. The bridge was finished before the permit expired on October 11, 2007.
The Court of Appeals considered Neighbors' arguments and affirmed the trial

2

R. 132 In reply to Mclntyre's motion to dismiss they wrote "Plaintiffs do not at
this time seek either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction." They ultimately
waited until Mclntyre had almost completed construction.
3

court's dismissal in a 2-1 decision. Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2008 UT
App. 353 ("Op.").
Mclntyre believes the decision of the majority below was correct and, inter
alia, it is procedurally and practically meaningless to remand to the trial court for
consideration of an expired permit or to enjoin the construction of a bridge when
construction is finished.
STATEMENT O F JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-l 02 (2008).
ISSUE PRESENTED

This Court has granted certiorari, stating the issue as "whether the majority
of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's
dismissal based on lack of standing." Neighbors claim this turns on subsidiary
issues. However, Neighbors' misstate those issues, and properly recast, they are
framed are as follows:
1.

Whether potential plaintiffs are "aggrieved" by an administrative

decision granting a permit (and thereby have standing) where they may face some
possible harm at some indeterminate future time and that possible harm arises
from:
a.

matters significantly attenuated from the permit's issuance; and

b.

requires a separate additional act of negligence by the
4

defendant.
2.

Whether potential plaintiffs have suffered an adverse effect caused by

a bridge where they allege the bridge poses an increased risk of contributing to
flooding if the bridge deck is in place and:
a.

the injury to plaintiffs is not from the flooding itself, but if
flooding occurs, it may or may not contribute to adverse
effects;

b.

the bridge deck is removable and will not cause flooding if
removed; and

c.

the owner of the bridge is subject to a duty to remove the
bridge deck upon request of authorities and the owner will
suffer actual flooding if the bridge causes any flooding.

3.

Whether allegations in a complaint are well-pleaded for purposes of a

motion to dismiss for lack of standing, where those allegations are conclusory in
nature and overstate or contradict expert reports and exhibits submitted with the
complaint as exhibits.
STATEMENT O F T H E CASE

The Neighbors have correctly stated the nature of the case and the decision
below, except for Neighbors' claim that the Court of Appeals "reformulated" the
test from Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74. As will be
5

explained below, Mclntyre disagrees with Neighbors' reading of the Court of
Appeals' decision.
STATEMENT O F FACTS

Mclntyre concedes the Neighbors' statement of facts is correct, except that
the following should be added:
1.

Neighbors' statement that Mclntyre obtained a permit from the

Division to build a bridge is a misstatement. See Opening Br. p. 1. The Division's
"Stream Channel Alteration Permit" was required operationally, but of itself, did
not allow the building of a bridge. Rather, as Exhibit E to Neighbor's Complaint
showed, that Permit allowed the temporary disturbance of Little Cottonwood
Creek during construction of the bridge's abutments; Once completed those
abutments are entirely upon property owned by Mclntyre and lie outside the
Creek's channel. (R. 89, Exhibit E to Neighbor's Complaint.)
2.

In addition to the Division's Permit, the bridge must meet the

requirements of Salt Lake County Flood Control (R. 11) and be approved by their
engineers, which Plaintiffs never contested. Inter alia, County Flood Control
requires as follows:
Private bridges and decks must be designed so as to allow removal
without significant structural damage to the flood control facility
[here Little Cottonwood Creek]. Property owners must agree to
remove decks upon request by Salt Lake County for maintenance and
other purposes.

6

Salt Lake County Public Works Flood Control Engineering, General Guidelines
for all Permit Applications; Online resource at
http://www.pweng.slco.org/flood/html/permitAppGuide/permitAppGuideH.html
(last accessed June 3, 2009).
3.

Neighbors did not and could not allege that either of them owns

property adjoining Little Cottonwood Creek, or that their property lies on the first
level flood plain. Thus, flooding and erosion caused by the Creek would never
directly impact Neighbors' properties. ( R. 1-8; see R. 25, 28, 69 and 113 (noting
the river terrace where Neighbors' properties lie is 75f above the first level flood
plain.))
4.

The Division's Permit was issued by the State Engineer on October

11, 2006 and expired on October 11, 2007. (R. 38-39)
5.

The State Engineer's response to Plaintiffs' request for

reconsideration, which Neighbors attached to their Complaint, pointed out that
"the natural condition of the stream is not being affected by the construction of
this bridge. No part of the structure is in the stream channel." (R.89, Exhibit E to
Complaint.)
6.

The Secor Report relied on by Neighbors, when fairly read, does not

state that the construction of Mclntyre's bridge will cause harm; Rather it notes
that even without the bridge the west bank of the Creek and the escarpment area

7

are at "significant risk of further erosion and potential property damage." 3 ( R. 26)
In part at least, that is because part of the river terrace slope, the escarpment,
already "is in direct contact with the Creek's Channel." ( R. 25) The river terrace
is made up of deltaic deposits, primarily sand and gravel, and "its steep slope is
quite unstable unless vegetated." ( R. 25) Thus, "building the bridge only
increases the risk." (R. 26)
7.

The second Secor Report also opines that the decking of the bridge

may cause floating debris to be caught at times of extreme flooding. (R. 65-68.)
It fails to note, however, that the bridge is built with a removable deck that can
and must be lifted as required Salt Lake County Flood Control ( supra), such as
times of extreme flood potential. (R. 113.) Logically, Secor's opinion on this
aspect requires an inference that Mclntyre will fail to fulfill his duty to keep the
bridge clear of debris or remove the deck. See (R. 38, item 3) (requiring
Mclntyre to monitor during high water events for debris passage, during
construction).
SUMMARY O F T H E ARGUMENT

Under any analysis, the claims regarding the Permit and those brought by
the Sorensons cannot survive because there is no standing. First, with respect to

3

The escarpment is owned by "Calder, " a third party who is a neighbor to both Brown
and Mclntyre who did not protest and was not a party.(R. 252, Tr. 8,1. 15- 20, p. 9,11. 3-4.)
8

the Permit, the third factor in Sierra Club's analysis, redressability, is missing.
The Permit is not an operational permit, like a drivers' license or the operating
permit in Sierra Club. It is akin to a building permit and expired in October 2007,
after the Bridge was built. Thus, the Permit cannot be modified, as the Court
alluded to as a possibility in Sierra Club, and it cannot be revoked because it
doesn't exist any more. No party has standing with respect to the Permit because
there are no claims that can be redressed through the Permit itself.
The Sorensons lack standing because under any standard, the Complaint
fails to assert allegations showing they met the three requirements from Sierra
Club. The Complaint itself is fairly devoid of specific references to the Sorensons
or their circumstances and, by itself, is insufficient. Reference to the Complaint's
exhibits is needed to determine any specifics. Even that, however, reveals that
there are no allegations that the Sorensons will suffer any distinct or palpable
injury as a result of the Bridge. Accordingly, the Sorensons lack standing to
complain of the Bridge.
As to the balance of the claims, including claims by the Neighbors in
general, the decision below was correct. First, the majority decision below
correctly applied this Court's formulation for standing as set forth in Sierra Club
v. Utah Dept. Air Quality, 2006 UT 74 and its predecessors.
The Neighbors characterize decision below as the majority's reformulation
9

of this Court's rule in Sierra Club. The dissent, however, did not disagree with
the majority's analysis of standing in this case; Judge Thome simply thought the
Neighbors should have been given a greater opportunity to develop their case. See
Op., % 18, Thome, J. dissenting ("I do not disagree with the majority's treatment
of standing law"). The Court of Appeals applied a plain language of the Sierra
Club ruling and correctly affirmed. As this Court noted in Jenkins v. Swan, courts
must often decide issues of standing prior to evidence being presented. Jenkins v.
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). Moreover, the
Neighbors' Complaint was fairly brief and conclusory. But Neighbors had already
commissioned and presented two engineering reports, which were attached to their
complaint. (R. 1-100.) The trial court, the Court of Appeals and this Court can
correctly review those exhibits and determine whether the Complaint's allegations
are well pleaded for purposes of a motion to dismiss. And although Neighbors are
entitled to reasonable inferences, they are not entitled to unreasonable inferences,
nor are they entitled to speculation.
In affirming the trial court, the majorit}^ below did not go beyond the first
prong of the Sierra Club inquiry, which requires that "the party must assert that it
has been or will be 'adversely affected by the [challenged] actions.'" Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74,1fl9 (brackets in original, citing Jenkins, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah
1983). The majority read "has been or will be" to mean what it says - "actual or

10

imminent" - that is, in the sense that it has occurred or is at least likely and that
flows from the actions challenged. Moreover, this case is significantly different
from Sierra Club and Neighbors simply are not in a position similar to the
Plaintiffs in that case who did have standing
I
Neighbors would have the courts disregard probability and causation as a
factor, replacing it with mere possibility. In this case it is only through a string of
unlikely events that the Bridge might cause the damage Neighbors allege.
Additionally, Neighbors would have this Court just disregard Mclntyre's
i

supervening negligence, which would be required for actual damage to occur. The
Bridge's deck is removable and Mclntyre is under a duty to remove it if requested
by Salt Lake County Flood Control. Mclntyre's property is in the first level flood
plain, adjacent to the Bridge, and in high water events, is at direct risk of flooding
well before the secondary events Neighbors allege even begin. Neighbors ask the
Court for the unreasonable inference that, in the already unlikely circumstance it
becomes necessary, Mclntyre will breach his duty to remove the bridge deck.
Because of this, any damage Neighbors might potentially suffer is completely
speculative and caused by Mclntyre's subsequent negligence.
Because no current injury was involved, the majority below correctly read
the first prong as requiring the Neighbors to allege two things: first, that an injury
or other adverse consequence might occur as a result of Mclntyre's bridge; and,
11

second, that the injury would occur at some reasonably foreseeable point in the
future. Neighbors would have the courts dispense with the causal connection as
well as a reasonable time frame. Under Neighbors' reading the phrase "has been
or will be adversely affected by the challenged action" would also include
"potentially, could be or might be," as to the types of injuries and causation. They
would also eliminate any temporal proximity between the protested event and the
future injury. This would open the gate for events that may some day have an
adverse affect, i.e., special conditions may some day occur, causing debris to
collect under and around Mclntyre's bridge, causing a damming affect, causing
flooding, which may exacerbate the erosion to the escarpment, which may be
providing lateral support for Brown's property, thus, causing an adverse affect.
Under the Neighbors view "has been or will be" has no temporal significance, and
apparently eons in the future is enough.
ARGUMENT

I.

There is no Redressable Claim Regarding The Permit Because it
is Expired.

Neighbors ask this Court to reverse the decision below and send this case
back for trial on the merits so their alleged injuries can be redressed, including
whether the Permit, which has expired, should now be revoked. Op. Brief p.p. 3536. Neighbors rely on the analysis used in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d
960, to argue at the end of their Opening Brief, that they meet the third prong for
12

standing because their "injuries are redressable, just like the injuries in Sierra
Club." Op. Brief p. 35. Neighbors' claim their injuries from the Permit are
redressable because "[t]he Division [of Water Rights] has the authority to revoke
the permit granted Mclntyre." Op. Brief p. 36.
That, however, is literally nonsensical, simply because the Permit here is
long expired and so different from the permit in Sierra Club. The permit in Sierra
Club, was issued by the Division of Air Quality "to construct and operate a [large]
coal-fired power plant." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^[2 (emphasis added).
i

i

Although plant construction had not begun, there was a permit in place that could
be revoked, reconsidered, or modified, which in turn, could impact the Sierra Club
plaintiffs. Their injuries could be redressed through the permit reconsideration
process.
Here, however, the Permit is long expired - October 11, 2007, to be exact.
(R. 38) There is no permit for this Court, the Third District Court, or even the
Division of Water Rights to revoke, reconsider, modify or adjust. It is a nullity.
Thus, Neighbors' contention that their injuries from the Permit can be redressed is
I
nonsensical. At best, revocation of an expired permit is a legal fiction and as such
cannot redress any injury.
Moreover in Sierra Club, the state agency had jurisdiction over certain
aspects of the power plant and could impact its construction as well as its
13

operation. See Sierra Club ^j 33 ("it has the power .. . [of] at least referring the
permit to the Division of Air Quality for further analysis to ensure that the
Executive Secretary's order authorizing the plant's operation complies state and
federal law").
No such authority ever existed here. The Permit was only tangent ially
related to the bridge at best, and had nothing to do with the bridge's operation or
continued existence. And once the Bridge was built, even if the Permit was still in
effect, its revocation would not mandate the Bridge's removal. In fact, another
permit would likely be required.4
II.

The Court of Appeals Chose The Proper Standard.

Neighbors argue the majority below misapplied the proper standard, which
this Court set forth in Sierra Club v. Utah DepL Air Quality, 2006 UT 74. It
appears to be agreed, however, that Sierra Club sets the general standard to be
applied for determining standing. Opening Brief p.p. 15-22; see Sierra Club,
2006 UT 74. ^f 1 ("we take the opportunity to reiterate and clarify Utah's standing
law").
Lest there be any doubt, the Court of Appeals chose Sierra Club as that
standard, stating as follows:
4

For reasons unknown to Mclntyre, Neighbors never sought a TRO to stay the Permit, nor
did they seek an interlocutory appeal of Judge Iwasaki's denial of their TRO seeking to enjoin
the actual construction of the Bridge. Those are the actions Neighbors could have taken and, in
effect, what they appeal here.
14

First, the party must assert that it has been or will be "adversely
affected by the [challenged] actions." Second, the party must allege a
causal relationship "between the injury to the party, the [challenged]
actions and the relief requested." Third, the relief requested must be
"substantially likely to redress [***5] the injury claimed."
Op. U 7 (quoting Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,f19, 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in
original), in turn quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 at 1149-50 (1983)). All
three prongs must be met. In short, "standing requires a showing of injury,
causation, and redressability." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 2007 UT 79, Tf59
(citations to Sierra Club etc. omitted).
IIIt

The Sorensons Did Not Allege or Demonstrate Even a Possible
Injury And, Therefore, Under Any Standard Upholding The
Dismissal of Their Claims is Proper.

Although Neighbors argue the court below "reformulated" the Sierra Club
standing analysis, under any plausible reading of Sierra Club and its predecessors,
Neighbors' Complaint did not allege any particularized injury that might befall the
Sorensons. They simply claim "me too" to a suppositional injury to the Browns.
Joseph Sorenson and Kathleen Sorenson are each named once as a party and they
are named in the paragraph describing the location of the bridge. ( R. 2)
(Complaintfflf3, 4, 12). Thereafter, the Complaint refers to the Plaintiffs generally
and one cannot discern from the Complaint what injury at all the Sorensons might
incur, much less what injury they would suffer because of the Permit or the
Bridge. See ( R. 1 - 8, the body of the Complaint).

15

On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing it is Sorensons burden to "show
that [they have] suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
2007 UT 79, ^59 (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div., 1999 UT 41,
Ifl 1, 979 P.2d 346 (in turn quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah
1983)) (alterations in Salt Lake City Corp.); and citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,
% 19, 148 P.3d 960.) Because nothing in the Complaint shows a distinct and
palpable injury, one must examine its exhibits to glean what Sorensons' injury
could be. See Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (overruled on
other grounds) ("an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clarify or
explain the same").
But the Secor Reports, which are attached to the Complaint and aire the
underlying bases for Neighbors' claims, say precious little about the Sorensons.
They do state, however, that all Neighbors' properties /development are 75 feet
above the first level flood plain. Logically, therefore, none are in danger of actual
flooding( R. 25.), but little else is said about the Sorensons or the Neighbors
collectively. But the first Secor Report does say that:
The deltaic deposits which make up the river terrace are primarily
fine sand and silt. The steep slope is quire unstable unless vegetated.
* * * *

A key point is that from approximately 100 yards up stream from
where the 1st level flood plain starts, to the escarpment located at the
16

downstream end of this area, the western side of the channel has not
been armored and is therefore, prone to erosion and subsequent
channel migration. Additionally, it is likely that the channel forces
responsible for the escarpment have been at least partially enhanced
by the placement of armoring and channel stabilization efforts along
the east flank of the creek.
* * % *

Photos 7 and 8 show settlement cracks along the eastern side of the
Brown Residence.
* * *

Additionally, SECOR recommends work begin immediately to
stabilize the escarpment and more completely understand the Brown
Residence settlement cracks.
( R. 25 -26, emphases added.)
Thus, according to Secor, irrespective of the Bridge or Permit, the western
bank (where the Browns are located) is prone to erosion because it has not been
armored and the east bank of the Creek has been armored. Also, irrespective of
the Bridge or Permit, the Brown residence shows settlement cracks and more study
is needed. However, nothing whatsoever is said about the Sorensens, their
property, or what impact the Bridge could have on them.
Apparently, one must guess that the Sorensens are suffering or will suffer
i

some injury because the Browns have suffered some settling. One must guess that
if the Bridge poses some increased risk to the Browns, ipso facto it must pose risk
to the Sorensons as well. But nothing in the Complaint or the attached Secor
Reports (R. 24 - 36 and R. 78 - 84) say that; nothing suggests how Sorensons

17

have been or might be harmed; and nothing in the Complaint or the Secor Reports
say how such harm might be attributed to the Bridge, much less the Permit.
"A mere allegation of adverse impact is not sufficient; there must also be
some causal relationship alleged between the injury to the plaintiff and the
governmental actions." Sierra Club v. Department ofEnvtl Quality, Div. of Solid
& Hazardous Waste, 857 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) quoting Jenkins v.
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). As to the Sorensons though, the
Complaint is not even that. If there is an allegation of adverse impact, no
particulars are given and there is no mention of a causal relation between the
imagined injury and Mclntyre's or the government's actions.
Finally, it must be noted that in the Neighbors' response to Mclntyre's
motion to dismiss, Sorensons had an opportunity to point the trial court 1o the
allegations of damage that might befall their property and link the Bridge as the
cause were it built. Instead, in their responsive memorandum they chose to rely
on the allegations of their complaint, stating "Plaintiffs' pleadings provide a
sufficient basis for the Court to conclude . . . that Plaintiffs meet the standing
requirements." (R. 131 - 132.) To their credit, Neighbors argued that "the
Sorenson property is also situated above and adjacent to property lying directly in
the first level flood plain [and] [d]amage to that property will undermine the
lateral support to the Sorenson property." ( R. 131.) The problem, however, is
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that this claim is mere argument, and neither the Complaint nor the Secor Report
say that. Likewise, neither the Complaint nor the Secor Reports make the
necessary causal link to the Bridge.
In sum, the Complaint alleges no claims as to the Sorensons and, under any
plausible reading of Sierra Club, dismissal was proper.
IV.

The Court of Appeals Applied Sierra Club to Properly Achieve its
Gate-Keeping Function.

"Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in
only those cases that are fit for judicial resolution.'" Sierra Club v. Utah Air
Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^f 17 quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands &
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986). Mclntyre does not dispute
Neighbors' extensive recitation of the underlying history and policy of Utah's
standing requirement in general. But Neighbors are incorrect in arguing that the
Court "below failed to address Sierra Club's holding regarding potential injury . .
. [and erred] because, contrary to Sierra Club, it denies standing in potential injury
cases." Op. Brief p. 20.
The Neighbors' reading of the decision below is simply too broad, because
nowhere does it decline standing as to potential injury cases in general Rather the
decision properly confirmed that Neighbors' claims were too speculative under
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the particular facts of this case.5 Op. ^f 12. Moreover, Neighbors ignore several
general concepts.
First, "standing questions are usually raised prior to the introduction of any
evidence, [and] [courts] will necessarily be required to make a judgment whether
proof of such a causal relationship is difficult or impossible and whether the relief
requested is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed." Jenkins v. Swan,
675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983) (citing K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §
22.20 at 368-70 (1982 Supp.)). Thus, procedurally there was nothing incorrect in
the Court of Appeals upholding dismissal. Judge Thome's dissent opines the
Complaint itself was sufficient and bringing the matter for summary judgment
would have been perhaps better (and perhaps the motion had been converted to
one). But as noted herein (infra.), Neighbors chose to rest on their pleadings and
the courts below were well within their authority to review the exhibits attached to
the Complaint. The dissent below focused on the conclusory allegations of the
Complaint's body, without viewing them through the lens of its exhibits, which
revealed the speculative nature of those claims. Op. \ 20, ^[22 n. 4. Moreover, it
did not take into account the fact that the Bridge's deck was removable, and that
Mclntyre would have to fail or refuse to remove it before any flooding could occur
5

McIntyre is perplexed by Neighbors' continued pursuit of the appeal and this Petition.
Irrespective of the State Engineer's decision granting the Permit, which is effectively moot, there
is nothing that would preclude Neighbors from filing a new suit, right now, seeking to have the
Bridge removed.
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as a result of the Bridge.
Second, although standing is a question of law, on appeal, the appellate
courts "give deference to the district court on factual determinations that bear
upon the question of standing." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, \9 citing Wash.
County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 18 and
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson ,946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997).
Here, that is precisely what occurred. The question was raised before the
introduction of evidence, and Neighbors chose to rely on their pleadings and the
attached exhibits. The Complaint's allegations were fairly "bare bones" and most
were "simply conclusory statements that the bridge will alter Little Cottonwood
Creek's natural stream flow and that Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs."
Op. \ 13. But the attached exhibits and specifically the Secor Reports, showed
that not only were the Neighbors' allegations conclusory, they were were also
highly conjectural and speculative. The trial court found as much (R. 218) and
the majority below gave proper deference when it upheld. Jones v. Barlow, 2007
UT 20,1J9 {supra).
The majority below began "by addressing the first part of [the] three-part
inquiry—whether Plaintiffs have been or will be adversely affected by Mclntyre's
bridge" Op. \ 8 (emphasis added). Sierra Club and related cases discuss this first
prong of "adverse effect" mostly in terms of whether the injury to the plaintiff is
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distinct from generalized damages visited upon the environment or the public at
large. See Op. \ 8 citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 20 (noting that a plaintiffs
interest must be real and personal). But clearly, there must also be a causal nexus
to the challenged action. To have standing the party must be "adversely affected
by the challenged actions." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \\9 (brackets omitted,
emphasis added).
The adverse effect in this case was settling in Browns' property. Secor
believed, but was not certain, that settling was caused by erosion of the
escarpment. See (R. 26.) ("With the instabilities observed in an around the
escarpment, as well as the settlement cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion of
the escarpment may increase the risks for significant property damage"). It could
also be caused by the instability of the steep slope, which was "primarily fine sand
and silt." (R. 25.) Given that no direct causal link was established, even between
the erosion and the adverse effect, the courts below properly inquired about the
probability that the Bridge itself could have any impact on Browns' settling
problem. Both courts properly concluded that any connection between the adverse
effect and the Bridge was too speculative.
Although Sierra Club was decided on summary judgment and this case on a
motion to dismiss, that does not gainsay the validity of the decisions below that
Neighbors claims were speculative. Neighbors chose to rely on their pleadings.
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Having so chosen, even given the benefit of accepting the Complaint's wellpleaded allegations true, no court was obliged to accept its conclusory allegations
as true. See York v. Unqualified Wash. County Elected Officials ,714 P.2d 679
(Utah 1986) (plaintiff did not establish standing where his "conclusory allegations
[we]re not supported by reference to any specific facts that show any jeopardy,
adverse impact, or injury").
Moreover, whether any specific allegation was in fact well-pleaded, was
properly viewed in light of the exhibits Neighbors chose to append to their
Complaint. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) overruled on other
grounds ("an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clarify or
explain the same"); see Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3) (lawyer not to offer
evidence known to be false).
The Complaint conclusorily stated that construction of the Bridge will result
in irreparable harm and damage to plaintiffs and their property. (R. 6.) But it
failed to particularize how. In Sierra Club, it was accepted that the plant would
cause emissions and, for purposes of summary judgment, that those emissions
would cause the injuries sworn to - even if that was some time in the future. No
such link was shown here.
Neighbors' Complaint and exhibits showed that something might happen,
but only through a string of "what ifs." As discussed infra., unlike in Sierra Club,
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there was no clear causal link between the settling, which was already occurring,
and the Bridge, which was not yet built. Instead, these "what ifs" were so
attenuated that it was extremely unlikely that the Bridge itself would ever be the
proximate cause of Neighbors' alleged damages. First, the Secor Report notes that
settling is already occurring, not because of the Bridge, but probably because the
river terrace, which is already in direct contact with the channel, is made up
primarily of sand and silt and its "steep slope [the steepest being the escarpment]
is quite unstable unless vegetated." ( R. 25.) Also, "the western side of the
channel [on which the escarpment lies] has not been armored and is therefore,
prone to erosion." (R.25.) Importantly, Neighbors' expert report concludes that
bank has been eroding since it became dry land and Browns counsel conceded
"that there's always going to [be] erosion where we have flowing water." (R. 256,
Tr. P.8). None of this has anything to do with the Bridge.
As to the Bridge, Secor opines that it " could create a channel constriction,"
not that it necessarily will. ( R. 26.) If a constriction resulted, Secor did not opine
that water will get backed up behind the Bridge, only that it could provide an
"opportunity" for that to happen - that is, //there are high flows and //debris gets
caught. Id. Then, if all that comes to pass, the escarpment, which is Calder's and
is already eroding because it is unarmored, has the potential for further erosion.
Id. If Calder's escarpment erodes more because of all this, it "may increase the
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risks for significant property damage." ( R. 26) This daisy chain of conjecture was
attenuated enough, but doesn't explain how a damming effect several hundred feet
upstream from the escarpment would do more than cause flooding on Mclntyre's
property, which would then return to the Creek well upstream of the escarpment.
That is the scenario laid out by Neighbors' Complaint and exhibits, which
the trial court was entitled to rely on, and which it found was just too speculative.
The majority below correctly upheld the trial court.
A.

Unlike Sierra Club, Neighbors Do Not Allege a Significant
Connection Between The Bridge And Any Adverse Effect.

Neighbors, however, claim to be situated similarly to those plaintiffs
granted standing in Sierra Club and also claim that the majority below
"reformulated" Sierra Club's requirements. Under Neighbors' analysis, though,
there is no temporal component; the mere potentiality of injury is sufficient, no
matter when it may manifest itself. But this case is significantly different and,
despite the different postures, the decision below was entirely consistent with the
Court's decision in Sierra Club.
First, in Sierra Club, there was no question under the state of the pleadings
that the plaintiffs had alleged injuries that would occur as a result of the power
plant. In Sierra Club two things were clear for summary judgment purposes: (1)
all parties conceded (or perhaps judicial notice taken) that there would be
emissions from the plant; (2) the plaintiffs' affidavits stated specific, distinct and
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palpable injuries that would happen to them from those emissions, for example:
In his affidavit, Mr. Cass alleges the plant will emit pollutants that
will impair visibility around his home and on the Colorado Plateau
and that this decreased visibility will affect his livelihood as a
videographer. . . . [i]f approved, the plant's emissions will impair his
health . . .and decrease the value of his property .
Sierra Club, ^ 4 (emphases added).
Ms. Roberts1 affidavit claims that if the plant is approved she will
suffer injury because the plant will emit pollutants that will
contaminate the soil and damage her crops , thereby jeopardizing her
livelihood. Likewise, she argues that the plant's emissions will
contaminate the waterways that she and her family use to irrigate the
crops they later eat. Ms. Roberts also asserts that the emissions from
the plant's construction and operation will negatively affect her
health.
Sierra Club, \ 5.
Thus, in Sierra Club, there was an adverse effect and a direct causal
connection between those harms and the plant. That, however, is not this case.
Brown does not allege that the Bridge is damaging or will directly damage his
property, but rather that settling is causing damage and settling is already
occurring. (R. 1-9 and R. 24 - 26) What he does allege is that erosion to the
escarpment is likely causing settling and erosion is occurring because the
escarpment is unarmored. The Bridge may (or may not) cause flooding and
flooding may (or may not) exacerbate that erosion. When such flooding might
occur and whether the Bridge would be the cause were simply unknown. Thus,
the speculative damage to Neighbors would arise thorough a chain of distant
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circumstances.
B.

The Risk Neighbors Assert Does Not Stem From The Bridge,
But From an Independent Intervening Act.

Neighbors go to great lengths to establish that increased risk can, itself, be a
harm. Mclntyre concedes that in some circumstances that can be true. That is not
to say, however, that mere speculation is sufficient for standing purposes. No
Court has gone there, nor should it.
As if the series of speculative events above did not relegate Neighbors'
claims to bin of speculation though, before any adverse impact could actually
result from the Bridge, one more speculation is required: that Mclntyre (who does
live on the first level flood plain, 75 feet below Plaintiffs) will just sit back and be
inundated as the water backs up behind his removable bridge. Thus, even
accepting all Neighbors' conjectural claims, they lack standing because the
increased risk stems not from the Bridge, but from an independent act or omission
by Mclntyre at some time in the indeterminate future. Mclntyre would still have
to commit an independent act of shear recklessness and fail to remove the Bridge's
removable deck. This is another factor not raised or addressed in Sierra Club.
As required by Salt Lake Flood Control, the Bridge's deck is removable,
and Mclntyre is obligated to remove it when do directed. (R. 113); see Salt Lake
County Public Works Flood Control Engineering, General Guidelines for all
Permit Applications, online at
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http://www.pweng.slco.org/flood/html/permitAppGuide/permitAppGuideH.html.
Unlike the Neighbors, Mclntyre lives on the flood plain, virtually next to
the Bridge and if a problem arises, his property will be at risk of actual flooding
well before the indirect impacts alleged by Neighbors even begin. Thus,
Neighbors' claims required an inference that Mclntyre would refuse or fail to
remove the bridge deck if that were to become necessary. But that is contrary to
common sense, in violation of his obligation to Salt Lake Flood Control, and is a
contingency that borders on inconceivable
Although it is not clear from the majority opinion below, this appears to be
just the type of factor it considered when it declined to "infer what events might
transpire to cause [] harm in the future." Op. ^[15, quoting LPA Inc. v. Chao, 211
F. Supp. 2d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2002). The majority noted the Neighbors alleged
potential dangers, but even those were contingent on things that might never
happen:
Indeed, the engineer's report attached to the complaint shows a
danger of possible damage to Plaintiffs' property if Little Cottonwood
Creek's water flows reach the same levels that they did in 1984.
However, the potential dangers are contingent on key, unknown
events—an increased water flow or a flood—which are dictated by
unknown weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs1 injury depends on
"'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed
may not occur at all.'"
Op. % 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 87 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1985) (quoting 13A
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Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (2d ed. 1984)).
It is possible that the trial court and majority below missed the importance
of the fact that the Bridge deck is removable. Yet, such independent intervening
events are critical because they directly impact and interrupt the causal chain that
is required under any standing analysis, be it Utah or federal. See Sierra Club v.
Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^[19 (the party must (1) be adversely affected
by the challenged actions and (2) there must be a causal relationship between the
injury to the party, the challenged actions and the relief requested) and Jenkins v
Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149-50 (also enunciating these two factors); see also Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Servs .Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (U.S. 2000)
(similar federal standard requires "(I)- • • "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action").
Here, the removability of the Bridge deck necessarily breaks that already
tenuous chain of events that Neighbors invoke to assert potential risk from the
Bridge. Mclntyre's failure or refusal to remove the Bridge deck is not an
inference to which Neighbors are entitled, but rather complete and irrational
speculation. Yet "when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently
established that determining causation becomes "completely speculative," the
claim fails as a matter of law." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996)
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citing Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) and Steffensen
v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff d,
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993).
V.

Neighbors5 Concept of Standing Should Not be Adopted by This
Court.

Neighbors essentially argue that the first standing factor - "has been or will
be adversely affected" should be expanded to include "potentially, could or might
be adversely affected." The gatekeeping function would be reduced to merely
inquiring if there is any possibility of injury at some unknown time in the future
and whether there is a possible a causal relationship between that someday injury
and challenged actions - no matter how remote. Under Neighbors' concept
standing is conferred on the farmer in Kansas for a claim against the boy in Brazil
for releasing the butterfly, based on the ephemeral "Butterfly Effect."

6

The majority below properly declined to be so expansive, which is not to
say that Neighbors do not raise valid concerns about how to deal with potential
injuries and standing. But this is not the case to raise them because there are
significant analytical difficulties that Neighbors sidestep and this case is simply
different than Sierra Club, which is why the majority below was correct.

6

For who released the butterfly, whose wings moved the air, which changed
the weather, which in turn had an impact on the tornado, whose course changed
and destroyed the farmer's barn
30

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals decision should be affirmed because Neighbors'
claims as to the Permit cannot be redressed by any relief. The Neighbors alleged
injuries arising out to Bridge itself are too conjectural and would require a future
intervening act of negligence or recklessness on Mclntyre's part.

,j
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Dated this _&_ day of June, 2009
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APPENDIX A

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Division of Water Rights
JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR.
Governor
GARY R. HERBERT
Lieutenant Governor

MICHAEL R.STYLER
Executive Director

JERRY D. OLDS
State Engineer/Division Director

Jim Mclntyre
558 East 5600 South
Murray, UT 84107
RE:

Octobell2006

RECEIVED
OCT 1 2 2006

KIRTON & McCONKIE

Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA to construct a bridge over Little
Cottonwood Creek at 558 East 5600 South in Salt Lake County.
EXPIRATION DATE: October i 1, 2007

Your application to Alter a Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA is hereby approved
pursuant to the requirements of Section 73-3-29 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This
approval also constitutes compliance with Section 404 (e) of the Clean Water Act (33 USC
1344) pursuant to General Permit 040 issued to the State of Utah by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers on October 15, 1987, and amended May 4, 2004.
L

The expiration date of this approved application is October 11, 2007. The expiration
date may be extended, at the State Engineer's discretion, by submitting a written
request outlining the need for the extension and the reasons for the delay in
completing the proposed stream alteration.

2.

A copy of this approved permit must be kept onsite at any time the work under this
approved permit is in progress.

3.

During high water events, the bridge must be monitored to allow for debris passage.

4.

To avoid proliferation of bridge crossings, this office will require your consideration
in allowing others to utilize the bridge, provided they adequately compensate you for
a portion of the cost of bridge construction and gain a legal right-of-way.

. 5.

Excavated material and construction debris may not be wasted in any stream Channel
or placed in flowing waters, this will include material such as grease, oil, joint
coating, or any other possible pollutant. Excess materials must be wasted at an
upland site well away from any channel. Construction materials, bedding material,
excavated material, etc. may not be stockpiled in riparian or channel areas.

6.

Machinery must be properly cleaned and fueled offsite prior to construction.

7.

Equipment should work from the top of the bank or from the channel to minimize
disturbance to the riparian area and to protect the banks. Heavy equipment should
avoid crossing and/or disturbing wetlands.

1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, PO Box 14630Q, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6300
telephone (801) 538-7240 • facsimile (801) 538-7467 • www.waterrights.utah.gov

Page 3
06-57-28SA
October 11,2006
This Decision is subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6 of the Division of Water Rights and to
Sections 63-46b-13^nd 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provide
t^fiTin|pritfr^^
for Reconsideration with the State Engineer, or an appeal with the
appropriate District Court. A Request for Reconsideration must be filed with the State Engineer
within 20 days of the date of this decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a
prerequisite for a court appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of this
Decision, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 days after the date the
Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for Reconsideration is considered denied
when no action is taken 20 days after the Request is filed.
If you have any questions or need further clarification, please contact Roddy Pirouznia at 801538-74*5.
Sincerely,

Jerry D. Olds, P.E.
State Engineer
JDO/rp/jm
Enclosure
This permit was mailed on f)cJT II AOQia

to the addressee and the following:

By: ^ZuUi

/y^cCtifcfr/i^J

^0ndy Mafeon, Secretary
Corps of Engineers
John Mann - Regional Engineer
Dave Ruiter - EPA
Carolyn Wright - Dept. of Natural Resources
Ashley Green - Wildlife Resources
Chris Springer - Salt Lake County
MCM Engineering
Calvin S. Johnson
Lawrence & Marilyn Brown
Gregory & Susan Hansen
Joseph & Kathleen Sorenson
Kirton & McConkie

